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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, are increasingly utilised by police and the 
military. In the UK, for example, a key application of drones by police organisations is to assist in searches for 
missing persons1, as well as crowd control2. In addition, drones are routinely used by the military in operations 
such as reconnaissance, target acquisition, and to carry out lethal strikes3,4. hese deployment strategies imply 
that drone-captured footage provides suicient information for person identiication. However, due to the var-
iable height and velocity at which drones ly, such footage is likely to be subject to momentum, unfavourable 
vantage points, and unpredictable ambient conditions. For example, military drones operate from ground level 
up to maximum altitudes of 200 t for micro drones4, which are small tactical drones of up to 2 kg in weight, and 
up to 45,000 t for large drones3,4 that comprise unmanned long-endurance aircrat of over 600 kg. Moreover, 
the ground speed at which these drones operate varies considerably, from 0–250 kts3,5. In addition, drones 
employed in police operations record surveillance footage whilst operating at altitudes ranging from ground 
level to up to 400 t, and at speeds of up to 38 kts6. his range in operational parameters raises the possibility that 
drone-captured footage can be of sub-optimal quality for person identiication.
he current study reports four experiments that investigate this issue, by examining the accuracy of person 
identiication from drone-captured footage of a football (soccer) match at a UK university. his set up presents 
a natural scenario that should provide relatively favourable conditions for image capture and subsequent person 
recognition. We recorded such footage with a commercially available remote-controlled drone, with a minimum 
take-of weight (MTOW) of 300 g. As classiied by NATO regulation, this type of drone falls into Class I(b)7 and is 
therefore comparable to micro drones in use by the UK military3 and police force6. We present four experiments 
that utilised the footage recorded with this drone to examine the accuracy of person identiication from such 
surveillance material.
To our knowledge, these experiments represent the irst systematic investigation of person identiication by 
human observers from aerial footage recorded by a remote-controlled drone. By contrast, a compelling body of 
research already exists on person identiication in other applied settings, such as passport control8,9, closed-circuit 
television (CCTV)10,11, and eyewitness scenarios12,13. his research demonstrates that familiar people, who are 
known to an observer, can be identiied with good accuracy14,15. his is found under challenging conditions, for 
example, when people are viewed in poor-quality surveillance footage11, or heavily degraded video16, or when 
they are only seen briely17, partially18,19, or in unfavourable non-frontal views20.
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his reliable recognition of familiar people is held to be based on sophisticated cognitive representations that 
build up through substantial exposure to a person’s face across a range of ambient conditions21,22. Such experience 
enables the extraction of the stable visual characteristics of an individual’s identity, and for the dissociation of 
this information from ambient factors that interact with a person’s appearance, such as variation in lighting or 
viewing direction23. he exact nature of these representations remains under investigation, but might relect a 
cognitive “average” of the encounters with a face22,24, with dimensions that capture the diferent ways in which a 
person’s appearance can vary around such an average21,25. Such approaches view familiarity as a continuum, from 
unknown to well-known faces. Consequently, whether a speciic point exists on this continuum at which faces can 
be deined as “familiar” is an open question. What is clear, however, is that when the cognitive representations of 
familiar faces are irmly established, these allow for recognition to generalise across a broad range of conditions, 
and to succeed even with very limited visual information11,18,19.
By contrast, the identiication of unknown or unfamiliar people, of whom an observer has no prior experience, 
is error-prone, even under seemingly good conditions. For example, when observers try to identify a target from 
a ten-face array, accuracy is only at 70%10,26. his is found with high-quality images that depict people in a frontal 
view, with a neutral expression, and under good lighting. Performance remains poor when this task is reduced 
to a 1-to-1 comparison27,28, or when observers match a live person to their photo29,30, or moving video images31. 
his diiculty of unfamiliar person identiication relects the fact that, without extensive prior exposure, observ-
ers can only have limited information about how a person can vary naturally in their appearance. Consequently, 
attempts to identify an unfamiliar person have to rely on unsophisticated image-comparison techniques. his 
issue is illustrated by the fact that unfamiliar face identiication is trivial across identical images21,22, but becomes 
more error-prone as variability in a person’s appearance increases across to-be-compared images32,33. Similarly, 
accuracy declines when lighting or viewing angle are variable across images34, or image resolution is poor35. 
Considering that drone-captured footage is restricted by such factors, the question arises also of the extent to 
which unfamiliar people can be identiied from such material. In this study, we investigate these questions across 
several tasks to examine the identiication of unfamiliar (Experiment 1) and familiar people (Experiment 2 and 3), 
as well as the perception of a person’s sex, race, and age from drone-captured footage (Experiment 4).
 ?
In this experiment, observers were presented with arrays comprising a high-quality face photograph and 
drone-captured images of a person, and had to decide whether these materials depicted the same person or two 
diferent people. Such identity-matching tasks have been used extensively in forensic face identiication36,37, and 
minimize the contribution of other factors, such as memory demands, that can reduce performance38. In light 
of the expected diiculty of this task, three drone-captured images were provided for comparison with each face 
photograph to increase the possibility that correct identiications are made32,39,40. Our drone was also equipped 
with two diferent forward-facing cameras, the footage of which was compared on a between-subject basis.

Ǥ Forty students (34 female) from the University of Kent, with a mean age of 22.1 years 
(SD = 8.0), participated for course credit. All experiments reported in this paper were approved by the Ethics 
Committee in the School of Psychology at the University of Kent and conducted in accordance with the ethical 
guidelines of the British Psychological Society. In all experiments, informed consent was obtained from all par-
ticipants before taking part.
Ǥ A remote-controlled Parrot AR Drone 2.0 Power Edition, with a minimum take-of weight (MTOW) 
of 300 g, was employed for stimulus capture. his type of drone falls into Class I(b) with a MTOW of 200 g-2 kg as 
classiied by NATO regulation7, and is comparable to drones that are in use by the UK military3 and police force6. 
he drone was equipped with two forward-facing cameras, comprising the drone’s integrated HD camera with a 
maximum video resolution of 1280 × 720 pixels at 30 fps, and a retro-itted GoPro Hero4 Silver with a maximum 
video resolution of 2704 × 1520 pixels at 30 fps. To provide stimulus footage for the experiments, this drone 
recorded the protagonists of a football game from pitch-side. Maximum light-height was restricted to 15 metres 
of elevation using the drone’s navigation sotware (AR.FreeFlight2.4 v2.4.22). From each camera, a total of 42 
images were extracted manually with graphics sotware, comprising three images for each of 14 diferent players. 
his footage was synchronized across cameras, so that it captured the players at the same point in time, but varied 
depending on each camera’s characteristics. he sets of three same-person images were arranged side-by-side, and 
displayed each at a size of 150 × 150 pixels for the drone camera at 72 ppi. he GoPro images were presented at a 
slightly smaller size of 120 × 120 at 72 ppi due to the higher resolution of this recording equipment. In addition, 
a high-quality full-face photograph was also taken for each player at a distance of approximately 1 m immediately 
prior to the drone recording. hese images were then cropped to remove extraneous background and resized to 
250 (W) × 340 (H) pixels at a resolution of 72 ppi.
To create the stimulus displays, the high-quality full-face images were arranged above three drone-captured 
video stills. For each of the 14 players, an identity match was created, in which the full-face photograph and 
drone-captured images depicted the same person, and an identity mismatch, in which two diferent people were 
shown. hese mismatch pairings were generated by the experimenters (MB and MCF) based on the extent to 
which diferent identities were similar in terms of race, hair colour, and age. However, considering the small pool 
of targets, the number of possible pairings was restricted greatly (for example, the pool of targets comprised only 
two players of African ethnic origin). Combining the stimulus images in this way resulted in a total of 56 exper-
imental trials, comprising 28 for each drone camera (14 identity matches and 14 mismatches). Example stimuli 
are illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Ǥ Participants were allocated randomly to one of the two camera conditions. he experiment 
was run on a computer using PsychoPy sotware41. Each trial began with a 1-second ixation cross, which was 
presented in the centre of the screen. his was followed by a stimulus array, which remained onscreen until a 
button-press response had been registered. Participants were asked to decide as accurately as possible whether a 
stimulus display depicted an identity match or mismatch, by pressing one of two designated buttons on a standard 
computer keyboard. Each participant completed 28 trials, which were presented in a unique random order.
he matching task was followed by a familiarity check to eliminate stimulus identities that might have been 
known to a participant prior to the experiment. For this purpose, the high-quality full-face photographs were 
presented individually and participants indicated whether they were familiar with a target, by providing a name 
or uniquely-identifying semantic information.
Figure 1. Illustration of an aerial view from the GoPro camera (top) with a highlighted target (red circle). he 
top array depicts three image stills from the drone-integrated camera and GoPro for this target, and the high-
quality face photograph for the familiarity check. he bottom array depicts the corresponding images of the 
mismatch identity that was selected for this target. Please note that the depicted target, and all other players 
visible in this igure, have provided informed consent for publication of these images.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Ǥ he experimental stimuli and the datasets generated and analysed during the current 
experiments are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

he familiarity check indicated that participants were familiar on average with 1.6 targets (SD = 1.2) in the drone 
camera condition and 0.3 targets (SD = 0.6) in the GoPro camera condition prior to the experiment. As each 
identity featured in one match and two mismatch trials, this led on average to the exclusion of 4.8 (SD = 3.6) and 
0.9 (SD = 1.7) trials in these conditions, respectively. For the remaining data, the percentage accuracy for identity 
match and mismatch trials was calculated.
For the drone’s integrated camera, match and mismatch accuracy was at 48.4% (SD = 12.9) and 73.2% 
(SD = 14.1), respectively. Similarly, accuracy for GoPro images was at 37.1% (SD = 16.0) for match trials and 
66.7% (SD = 14.4) for mismatch trials. A 2 (camera type: drone cam vs. GoPro) × 2 (trial type: match vs. mis-
match) mixed-factor ANOVA of these data revealed a main efect of camera type, F(1,38) = 12.94, p < 0.001, 
ƞp
2 = 0.25, due to overall higher accuracy for the drone camera, and a main efect of trial type, F(1,38) = 50.59, 
p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.57, due to higher accuracy for mismatch trials. An interaction between factors was not found, 
F(1,38) = 0.39, p = 0.53, ƞp
2 = 0.01.
As accuracy was low, this was also compared to chance performance (i.e., of 50%) via a series of one-sample 
t-tests (with alpha corrected at p < 0.0125 [i.e., 0.05/4] for multiple comparisons). his revealed that mismatch 
accuracy for the drone camera and the GoPro was above chance, t(19) = 7.36, p < 0.001 and t(19) = 5.19, 
p < 0.001, respectively. By contrast, match accuracy was at chance for the drone camera, t(19) = 0.57, p = 0.58, 
and below chance for the GoPro, t(19) = 3.61, p < 0.01.

Observers’ ability to match drone-captured images to high-quality photographs of unfamiliar faces was at or 
below chance, with accuracy averaging 43% across camera conditions, which indicates that positive person iden-
tiications could not be made reliably. Mismatch decisions were comparatively better but still highly error-prone, 
averaging at 70%. his low accuracy was obtained despite the provision of three drone-captured images for com-
parison with each target, which should facilitate person identiication32,39,40, and under conditions in which the 
mismatch stimuli were constructed from a limited number of identities.
As a small extension of this work, we also compared person identiication for footage from two diferent 
camera types, comprising the drone’s integrated HD camera and a retro-itted GoPro Hero4 Silver. his revealed 
an advantage for the drone’s integrated camera (61%) over the GoPro (52%). he diference in identiication 
accuracy between these cameras might relect that the drone’s integrated equipment is better optimized for the 
viewing conditions that are incurred by aerial recordings. However, even for footage captured with the drone’s 
integrated camera, identiication accuracy was generally low. By comparison, in face-matching studies that com-
bine high-quality face portraits from more conventional footage in 1-to-1 comparisons, and utilise more reined 
identity mismatches, mean accuracy is typically at 80–90%27,28. he current results therefore suggest that the 
identiication of unfamiliar people from drone-captured footage is a particularly diicult task.
 ?
Whereas unfamiliar face identiication is error prone, recognition of familiar faces, that we have encountered 
many times before, is much more accurate42,43 and proceeds even under challenging conditions, such as when 
poor-quality surveillance footage is employed11. Consequently, it is possible that people can be identiied reli-
ably from drone-captured footage when they are familiar to the observer. his was explored in Experiment 2 
by assessing recognition accuracy of observers that personally knew the people in this footage. Two groups of 
observers were compared, comprising colleagues of the depicted targets and members of the same football group. 
Participants in the latter group had not been present during the recording of the drone footage, but had the addi-
tional contextual advantage of knowing who comprised the members of the football team to facilitate identiica-
tion. Non-face objects can be identiied in familiar contexts from images with very low resolution44. Experiment 2 
investigates whether a similar advantage is also present during person identiication from drone-captured footage.

Ǥ he group of colleagues comprised 17 academic staf members (eight male) at the University of 
Kent, with a mean age of 37.6 years (SD = 11.0), who worked alongside several of the people that were depicted 
in the drone-captured footage. he group of teammates consisted of ten participants (all male), with a mean age 
of 44.8 years (SD = 14.6), who were members of the same football group but were absent from play on the day of 
the drone recording.
Ǥ he stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, but the face-matching task was 
replaced with a recognition test. hus, the three-image arrays of drone images were now presented without the 
high-quality face image and participants were asked to name the depicted people directly. If participants indicated 
familiarity but were unable to name the target, then they were asked to provide unique semantic information 
to conirm identiication. In this manner, all participants were presented with 28 stimulus arrays, comprising a 
three-photo array for each of the fourteen target identities and each of the two cameras. Ater completion of this 
task, all participants were given a familiarity check comprising the high-quality full-face photographs.

In the familiarity check, participants recognized on average 3.8 (SD = 0.5) of 14 targets in the colleagues group, 
equating to 27.3% (SD = 3.8) of identities, and 10.3 (SD = 3.2) of 14 targets, or 73.6% (SD = 22.8), in the team-
mates group. For these familiar identities, performance with the drone-captured images was analysed by grouping 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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responses into correct identiications of a target (hits), incorrect identiications of a target as somebody else (misi-
dentiications), and those cases in which no identiications were made (misses). In addition, performance was cal-
culated for targets that observers indicated as unknown in the familiarity check. For these, the percentage of trials 
was calculated on which an identiication was incorrectly made (false positives) from the drone-captured images.
he mean percentages of responses that fall into each of these categories are illustrated in Table 1 for both 
cameras and participant groups. hese data show that recognition performance was extremely poor. For example, 
across both cameras in the teammates group, targets could be identiied on only 36% of trials (hits). By contrast, 
27% of familiar faces were misidentiied as someone else, and 19% of unfamiliar faces were also falsely identiied 
as someone familiar. his poor performance was even more marked in the colleagues group, where hits averaged 
across both cameras were very low, at 8%, whilst almost twice as many misidentiications (16%) were made.
To analyse these data, separate 2 (group: teammates vs. colleagues) × 2 (camera type: drone cam vs. GoPro) 
mixed-factor ANOVAs were conducted for each of the four measures. For hits, this analysis revealed a main 
efect of group, F(1,25) = 37.51, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.60, due to higher recognition accuracy among teammates than 
colleagues. In turn, a main efect of group was also found for misses, F(1,25) = 17.21, p < 0.001, ƞp
2 = 0.41, as the 
teammates were less likely to fail to identify a known person. For hits and misses, a main efect of camera was 
not found, F(1,25) = 1.67, p = 0.21, ƞp
2 = 0.06 and F(1,25) = 0.00, p = 0.95, ƞp
2 = 0.00, and no interaction between 
factors, F(1,25) = 0.42, p = 0.52, ƞp
2 = 0.02 and F(1,25) = 0.00, p = 0.97, ƞp
2 = 0.00, respectively. None of the main 
efects or interactions were signiicant for misidentiications and false positives, all Fs(1,25) ≤ 2.33, all ps ≥ 0.14, 
all ƞp
2 ≤ 0.09.
he diferent response categories were also compared directly to determine which identiication outcome was 
most likely. For this analysis, the data for both cameras were combined and a series of paired-sample t-tests were 
conducted to compare hits, misses, misidentiications and false positives (with alpha corrected at p < 0.008 [i.e., 
0.05/6] for multiple comparisons). For teammates, this analysis failed to ind diferences between any of the meas-
ures, all ts(9) ≤ 2.05, all ps ≥ 0.07. hus, teammates were as likely to make a correct identiication as an incorrect 
identiication, or to fail to recognize a target altogether. In the colleagues group, observers recorded more misses 
than hits, misidentiications and false positives, all ts(16) ≥ 5.26, all ps < 0.001, whereas these three measures did 
not difer from each other, all ts(16) ≤ 1.95, all ps ≥ 0.07.

Teammate observers already knew more of the targets than colleagues prior to the experiment. hey were also 
more likely to identify these familiar targets from the drone-captured footage, and less likely to fail to recognize a 
known person, indicating a context advantage that facilitated identiication from low-quality images44. Generally, 
however, recognition accuracy was poor for both groups. For example, teammates only identiied 36% of targets 
that could be recognized from the high-quality images, and recognition accuracy for colleagues was at just 8%. 
hus, still images from drone-captured footage only allow for very limited recognition of familiar people. his 
problem is compounded by incorrect identiications, both for targets that were personally familiar and unfamiliar, 
which occurred as frequently as correct identiications.
Once again, we also compared person identiication from footage captured by the drone’s integrated cam-
era and a retro-itted GoPro. As in Experiment 1, an advantage in correct identiications, and a corresponding 
reduction in incorrect identiications, was obtained for the integrated camera. While this is consistent with the 
notion that the characteristics of this equipment might be more optimized for aerial footage than the GoPro, these 
diferences were small (~4%) and not statistically reliable in Experiment 2. his might suggest that diferences in 
recording equipment exert less of an efect on the identiication of familiar than unfamiliar faces.
 ?
Whilst the identiication of familiar people is diicult from drone-captured still images, identiication can be 
enhanced when moving images are provided45, particularly under diicult viewing conditions16,46. Experiment 
3 therefore investigated the recognition accuracy of familiar people from moving drone-captured footage, by 
replacing the image arrays of Experiment 2 with 10-second video recordings from which these still images were 
originally taken. Due to the comparable performance across camera types in Experiment 2, only footage from the 
drone’s integrated camera was employed in Experiment 3.
Experiment 2
Colleagues
Hits Misids Misses False positives
Drone camera 11.2 (16.7) 13.4 (20.3) 75.4 (29.4) 14.1 (18.0)
GoPro camera 5.6 (10.4) 19.1 (27.3) 75.3 (29.3) 16.4 (21.2)
Teammates
Drone camera 36.5 (11.0) 25.8 (17.9) 37.7 (12.6) 18.1 (20.9)
GoPro camera 34.6 (12.9) 28.1 (16.3) 37.3 (17.1) 20.0 (26.2)
Experiment 3 Teammates
Drone camera 32.7 (16.1) 8.7 (14.0) 32.7 (16.1) 30.7 (36.0)
Table 1. Person Identiication Performance for Experiment 2 and 3, by Participant Type (Colleagues versus 
Teammates) and Camera Type (Drone versus GoPro Camera). Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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
Ǥ he participants consisted of 16 males who were members of the football group that was 
recorded by the drone. Seven of these participants are depicted in the drone footage, whereas the other nine were 
absent from play on the day of the drone recording. One participant failed to record their age. he remaining par-
ticipants had a mean age of 42.7 years (SD = 10.7). Data collection was conducted online and participants were 
invited to take part via a football members email list.
Ǥ he stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 2, except that the stimu-
lus arrays comprising three drone-captured images were replaced with the video footage from which these still 
images had been taken. his footage was displayed in an online browser using Qualtrics survey sotware. In total, 
14 video clips were shown, comprising a 10-second recording from the integrated drone camera for each of the 
14 target identities. As the recording captured a game of football, several targets were visible in each video clip. 
he irst second of each video therefore displayed a still image in which the to-be-identiied target identity was 
highlighted with a red circle, followed by nine seconds of moving footage that followed on naturally from the still. 
Following each video, participants were asked to name the target or to provide unique semantic information for 
identiication. he videos were shown in a random order. Ater completion of the video task, all participants were 
given the familiarity check comprising the high-quality full-face photographs.

he familiarity check indicated that participants recognized on average 10.5 (SD = 2.5) of the 14 targets, equating 
to 75.0% (SD = 18.1) of identities. For these familiar identities, performance with the drone-captured footage was 
broken down into hits, misidentiications and misses (see Table 1). In addition, performance for unfamiliar tar-
gets was also converted into false positives. Note that two of the 16 observers recognized all of the target identities 
in the familiarity check. Analysis of false positives is therefore based on N = 14.
To determine which identiication outcome was most likely, the diferent response categories were compared 
directly via a series of paired-sample t-tests (with alpha corrected at p < 0.008 [i.e., 0.05/6] for multiple compar-
isons). his analysis revealed that more hits than misidentiications of familiar targets were made, t(15) = 4.71, 
p < 0.001. By contrast, the percentage of hits was comparable to false positive identiications of unfamiliar targets, 
t(13) = 0.21, p = 0.84. Target misses exceeded misidentiications, t(15) = 5.99, p < 0.001. Misses also exceeded 
hits and false positives, but these diferences were not signiicant, t(15) = 2.87, p = 0.01 and t(13) = 1.89, p = 0.08, 
respectively. Misidentiications did not difer reliably from false positives, t(13) = 2.27, p = 0.04.
To examine the potential beneit of moving footage for identiication directly, these data were compared 
with the teammates’ performance with still images from the drone camera in Experiment 2 via a series of 
independent-samples t-tests (with alpha corrected at p < 0.013 [i.e., 0.05/4] for multiple comparisons). his 
revealed that hits were comparable for still images and moving footage, t(24) = 0.65, p = 0.52, as were false posi-
tives, t(22) = 0.99, p = 0.33. By contrast, still images gave rise to more misidentiications, t(24) = 2.73, p < 0.013, 
and fewer misses, t(24) = 2.71, p < 0.013.
Due to the restricted subject pool that teammates provide, seven of the participants of Experiment 3 also 
appeared in the stimulus footage as football players. As a inal step of the analysis, this allowed us to probe 
self-recognition from the drone footage. All recognized themselves in the familiarity check, but only three of 
these seven participants (41.9%) recognized themselves in the drone video. Of the remaining four participants, 
one misidentiied themselves as another person (14.2%) and three could not make an identiication (41.9%).

he percentage of correct identiications from moving drone-captured footage in this experiment was comparable 
to the static drone footage of Experiment 2. Still images gave rise to more misidentiications of familiar people and 
fewer cases in which no identiication was made. his suggests that moving drone footage might lead participants 
to exert more caution in committing to an identiication. At the same time, false identiications, of targets that 
were not known to participants prior to the experiment, were comparable across both types of footage.
Overall, these data conirm that person identiication from drone footage is highly error-prone. his appears 
to be the case under conditions that typically facilitate identiication, namely when recognition of familiar people 
is examined11,42,43, context limits the number of possible answers47, and moving footage is supplied16,46. In addi-
tion, the stimuli also provided body information, which can aid identiication further48,49. he diiculty of this 
task is illustrated further by the observation that only three of seven participants who were featured as stimuli 
could identify themselves from the drone footage.
 ?
Considering that identiication is highly error-prone, the question arises of whether other person information 
can be gleaned from drone-captured footage. In Experiment 4, observers unfamiliar with the targets depicted 
in the drone-captured footage were asked to judge the sex, race and age of these persons. his information is 
typically extracted accurately from high-quality images50–54. It is unknown to which extent this is possible from 
drone-captured footage.

Ǥ A total of 60 participants (33 female) volunteered to participate in this experiment. Two partic-
ipants did not record their age. he remaining participants had a mean age of 26.4 years (SD = 15.0). All reported 
normal (or corrected-to-normal) vision. Data collection was conducted online and participants were invited to 
take part via an email list for research volunteers.
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Ǥ For each target, a drone-captured still image was selected from the stimulus arrays 
of Experiment 2, which depicted the person in frontal or near-frontal face view, as well as the high-quality photo-
graphs. he drone-captured images were presented at a size of 150 × 150 pixels, whilst digital photographs were 
presented at a size of 400 × 300 pixels at a resolution of 72 ppi. In the experiment, these stimuli were displayed 
in a web browser using Qualtrics sotware on a between-subject basis. hus, half of the participants viewed the 
drone images, whilst the other half the viewed high-quality face photographs. For each target, observers were 
required to make sex, race, and age judgements, which were presented in multiple-choice format. For sex, the 
response options consisted of “male” and “female”. For race, these choices comprised “White”, “Black”, “Asian”, 
“Mediterranean”, “Indian”, and “Hispanic”, to relect the ethnicities of the depicted football players, as well as 
“Middle-Eastern”, and “Mixed-Ethnicity”. In addition, observers were permitted to enter an alternative classiica-
tion in text. For age, each option covered a period of ten years, with 10–19 years and 60 + years being the young-
est and oldest possible responses, respectively. In addition, each question included “Cannot tell” as a possible 
response option. Finally, as a familiarity check, participants were also asked to name targets, or to provide unique 
semantic information, for any targets that were recognized.

he familiarity check indicated that none of the participants recognized any of the 14 targets. he mean per-
centage of correct responses was then calculated for the drone and high-quality images for the sex, race, and age 
decisions. An independent-samples t-test showed that the accuracy of sex decisions was better for high-quality 
face photographs at 98.6% (SD = 3.5) than the drone images at 62.6% (SD = 13.6), t(58) = 14.03, p < 0.001. A sim-
ilar advantage for high-quality photographs was observed for race decisions, at 74.3% (SD = 14.8) versus 42.4% 
(SD = 10.3), t(58) = 9.68, p < 0.001, and age decisions at 46.4% (SD = 12.4) versus 26.9% (SD = 13.5), t(58) = 5.84, 
p < 0.001.

his experiment provides broader evidence that drone-captured footage forms an unreliable basis for person per-
ception. Sex information, for instance, was extracted poorly from drone stills, for which only 63% of targets were 
classiied correctly. We did not plan to examine sex categorisation when we initiated this series of experiments, 
but were led to examine this question by the poor identiication accuracy in Experiments 1 to 3. Consequently, all 
of the targets in the drone-captured footage were men, rather than a mixture of males and females. his one-sided 
sample could have afected observers’ responses from drone-captured footage, by leading to some female-sex 
decisions on the basis that observers might have expected a proportion of such stimuli in a sex categorization 
task. However, this was clearly not the case for the high-quality face photographs, for which performance was at 
ceiling. his contrast demonstrates that the low accuracy of sex categorization is relective of the drone-captured 
footage, rather than the composition of targets’ sexes in this experiment. Accuracy for race and age decisions from 
drone-captured footage was even lower, at 42% and 27%, respectively. hus, these decisions were more likely to be 
incorrect than correct under the current conditions. By contrast, performance with the face photographs here, as 
well as previous research, demonstrates that sex, race and age information are consistently extracted with much 
better accuracy from high-quality images50–54.


This study explored the extent to which people can be identified from aerial footage recorded by a 
remote-controlled drone. he identities of unfamiliar (Experiment 1) and familiar target people (Experiment 
2 and 3), and their sex, age and race (Experiment 4) were diicult to extract from drone-captured footage. his 
suggests that such footage provides a challenging substrate for person classiication. In an extension of this work, 
we also compared identiication of unfamiliar (Experiment 1) and familiar targets (Experiment 2) for footage 
from two diferent camera types, comprising the drone’s integrated HD camera and a retro-itted GoPro. Whilst 
this revealed a small advantage for the drone’s integrated camera, identiication accuracy was generally low for 
both camera types.
Many factors could account for these results. he movement speed and trajectory of the drone, its light sta-
bility, as well as distance-to-target and its high vantage point are likely to degrade the available information for 
person identiication. On the other hand, we employed high-deinition recording equipment with good image 
stabilisation, light height was limited to only 15 meters, targets were recorded from pitch-side, against a uniform 
background (the green pitch), and the number of (familiar) target identities was limited.
In this context, the current data have important implications. Drones are already employed routinely in mili-
tary and police operations, for example, in searches for missing persons1, crowd control2, and military reconnais-
sance and lethal strikes3,4. he drone of the current study provides a limited proxy for military aircrat drones. 
However, some of the smaller drones employed by military and police are comparable to the equipment of this 
study6. For example, some police-employed drones operate at altitudes between ground level and 400 t and at 
speeds from 0 to 38 kts3,6,7. Moreover, some of these drones carry recording equipment with a resolution that is 
substantially less than the cameras employed here (e.g., only 640 × 512 pixels)55. By comparison, the drone in the 
current study recorded targets from a maximum altitude of 49 t in the experiment and was equipped with two 
cameras with considerably higher resolution (e.g., 1280 × 720 pixels for the drone’s integrated HD camera). In 
addition, the targets’ distance and orientation to the drone varied naturally during the recordings, thereby pro-
viding multiple perspectives to facilitate identiication. hese advantages did not appear to ofset the diiculty of 
the task, however. Consequently, the inding that it is extremely diicult to identify people, or even just their sex, 
race and age from drone-recorded footage, such as that provided in the current study, raises concerns about their 
application for person perception in police and military operations.
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In drawing these conclusions, we note also that this is only the irst study to explore person identiication with 
drone-captured footage. Our trial count was restricted by the number of targets that could be recorded, whilst 
sample size was limited by participants who were familiar with these targets. Moreover, it is presently unknown 
how these indings generalize across diferent drone types and viewing conditions. It is possible, for example, 
that the poor accuracy in person identiication that was observed here can be ofset when light height is lowered 
or drone-to-target distance is reduced, though operational requirements may not allow this to safeguard those 
on the ground56 or to avoid detection of a drone during covert deployment2. Similarly, it is possible that per-
son identiication from drone-captured footage might be improved by magniication equipment, such as optical 
zoom, though this may also increase the diiculty of target tracking. In addition, we note that the identiication 
of unfamiliar people can be di cult even with high-quality face portraits8,26,28,42. hus, the extent to which person 
identiication is possible from drone-captured footage under viewing conditions that are optimised further is an 
open question.
Finally, whilst the aim of the current study was to examine person identiication from drone-captured footage 
by human observers, similar studies in computer vision are now beginning to emerge57. his raises the ques-
tion of how the accuracy of human observers and machine algorithms in person identiication might compare. 
Face-matching studies with more conventional footage suggest that machine algorithms outperform human 
observers under conditions of moderate diiculty58,59, and perform at least to a similar level with challenging face 
pairs, such as images in which illumination and a person’s day-to-day appearance are variable58,59. However, the 
face images that were employed in these studies are of substantially higher quality than the drone-footage under 
investigation here, making it diicult to draw direct comparisons at this point in time.
In conclusion, the current study suggests that a person’s identity, sex, race and age are diicult to extract from 
drone-captured footage. However, more extensive studies are clearly needed to investigate unfamiliar and famil-
iar person identiication and categorization from drone-captured footage, with more stimuli and greater sample 
sizes, utilising more drone types, a greater range of image-capture and magniication devices, and with footage 
recorded under a much wider range of viewing conditions. Comparisons of human observers and machine algo-
rithms in person identiication from drone-captured footage are also required to advance the ield.
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